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COMMENT 
 
Executive Power and Regional Climate 
Change Agreements 
CONOR J. WALLINE* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The growing threat of climate change has, over the past 
twenty years, spurred numerous unsuccessful attempts to 
generate comprehensive binding international agreements aimed 
at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  The reluctance of the 
United States and other countries to commit to the reduction 
targets set forth in the Kyoto Protocol—by far the most 
progressive international initiative—as well as the more recent 
disappointments at Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban, and Rio, 
exemplify the difficulty in achieving a global agreement on 
climate change mitigation. 
In response to these tepid efforts and the lack of political 
action at the domestic level, certain U.S. states have begun to 
create regional agreements with one another. In particular, the 
use of the executive authority of the Governor of New York to 
arrange regional agreements like the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, Transportation and Climate Initiative, and Mid-
Atlantic Governors’ Agreement on Ocean Conservation, 
underscores the potential for effective regional approaches to 
climate change mitigation. Created by executive order, each of 
these agreements circumvented the time-consuming and 
contentious process of legislative enactment in Albany, and has 
 
* Thanks to Professor John R. Nolon, Professor of Law at Pace Law School 
and Counsel to the Land Use Law Center, for his invaluable assistance with the 
ultimate direction of this Article. 
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subsequently provided a coordinated framework for addressing 
climate concerns. 
This Article explores the potential for such agreements to 
address climate change on a regional level by analyzing the 
parallels between the agreements, the nature and limits of the 
executive power used to create them, and the scope of 
enforcement available under them. Section II briefly examines 
the present state of climate warming and its attendant impacts, 
while Section III highlights the relative failure of current 
national and international approaches to mitigating climate 
change. Section IV focuses on the recent rise of environmental 
regional agreements in the United States, specifically those 
agreements to which the State of New York has been integral. 
Section V then explores how the use of executive authority by the 
Governor of New York has engendered limited success—primarily 
through the greenhouse gas reductions committed to and 
realized—in these agreements. The Article concludes by 
considering the way these achievements can serve as examples 
for the creation of a federal or, ideally, international agreement to 
combat climate change. 
II.  A WARMING STATUS QUO 
Unequivocal scientific data confirm that the earth’s climate 
system is warming.1 According to the United Nations 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), “Eleven of 
the last twelve years. . .rank among the twelve warmest years in 
the instrumental record of global surface temperature (since 
1850).”2  Currently, the concentration of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) in 
the atmosphere is 392 parts per million (“ppm”), 42 ppm more 
than “what many scientists, climate experts, and progressive 
national governments are now saying is the safe upper limit for 
CO2 in our atmosphere.”3  What’s more, the effects of climate 
change on human beings are already apparent. In the past two 
years alone, the eastern seaboard of the United States has 
 
 1. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 30 (2007), available at 
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Bill McKibben, 350 Science, 350.ORG, available at http://www.350.org/en/ 
about/science. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/5
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experienced two extreme weather systems (Hurricane Irene and 
Superstorm Sandy) that, some scientists speculate, but for the 
warming climate and subsequent melting arctic sea ice, likely 
would not have made landfall so far north.4 In fact, with 
Superstorm Sandy, the melting arctic sea ice helped to create a 
“rare late October high pressure area over Greenland. . .[b]y 
heating up the Arctic, altering the temperature difference 
between the equator [and] the poles, and forcing the jet stream to 
slow down and get stuck in big looping meanders. . .”5 This 
altered weather pattern helped cause upwards of $50 billion in 
damage to the eastern seaboard alone.6 Worst of all, this is not 
expected to be an isolated event: as New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo acknowledged in an op-ed immediately following Sandy, 
“Extreme weather is the new normal.”7 Essentially, extreme 
weather events—including not only hurricanes, but also heat 
waves, heavy rains, and snowstorms—are now more likely than 
ever to occur because of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions.8 
Experts agree that a dual approach is necessary to address 
this truly global problem.9  First and foremost, countries must 
agree to limit their GHG emissions.  The IPCC, in no uncertain 
 
 4. Larry O’Hanlon, How Much Climate Change Was in Hurricane Sandy?, 
DISCOVERYNEWS, Nov. 2, 2012, available at http://news.discovery.com/earth/ 
sandy-and-the-record-arctic-sea-ice-melt-121102.html. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Chris Isidore, Sandy’s cost to economy: Up to $50 billion, CNN MONEY, 
Nov. 2, 2012, available at http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/02/news/economy/ 
sandy-economic-impact/index.html. 
 7. Andrew Cuomo, Op-Ed.,  We will lead on climate change, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/lead-climate-
change-article-1.1202221. 
 8. See Morgan Bettex, Study sees changing intensity of storms from 
warming, MIT NEWS (Oct. 25, 2010), http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2010/weaker-
summers-1026.html.; see also Justin Gillis, Study Finds More of Earth is Hotter 
and Says Global Warming Is at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/science/earth/extreme-heat-is-covering-
more-of-the-earth-a-study-says.html?hp&_r=0; see also Nick Cumming-Bruce, 
U.N. Agency Says 2012 Ranks Among Hottest Years, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2012, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/science/earth/un-agency-says-
2012-ranks-among-hottest-
years.html?hp&gwh=B7176927CD5D9746F8B764CCE827503A. 
 9. See generally Alison G. Kwok & Nicholas B. Rajkovich, Addressing 
climate change in comfort standards, 45 BUILDING & ENV’T 18 (2010), available 
at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360132309000456. 
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terms, has stated that “unmitigated climate change would, in the 
long term, be likely to exceed the capacity of natural, managed 
and human systems to adapt.”10  As a result, fairly radical 
measures—possibly including a 60% net reduction in GHG 
emissions by 2050—will need to be implemented “[t]o stabilize 
atmospheric GHG concentrations at close to current levels.”11 
Second, the world is going to have to adapt to the changing 
climate and its effects. While some adaptive measures have 
certainly occurred, much more comprehensive adaptation will be 
necessary to decrease vulnerability to the myriad effects of 
climate change, a fact demonstrated by the devastating impacts 
of Superstorm Sandy on both New York and New Jersey.12 The 
onus of achieving effective adaption measures will be primarily 
on state and local governments, since factors like location, 
geographical features, weather patterns, and current 
infrastructure will play a critical role in determining which 
measures to implement.13 Efforts to mitigate GHG emissions, on 
the other hand, must be made on a more comprehensive basis. 
III.  TEPID DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
EFFORTS 
Given the scientific unanimity that anthropogenic climate 
change is occurring, and the threat it poses to the continuing 
survival of the planet as well as our way of life, it would not be 
unreasonable to think that far-reaching international efforts are 
in the process of combatting it. Yet, this is not the case. As of 
summer 2013, there was still no truly global agreement aimed at 
mitigating GHG emissions.  In fact, even the November-
December 2012 round of climate talks in Doha, Qatar did not 
 
 10. IPCC, supra note 2, at 73. 
 11. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, 
LAW, AND SOCIETY 631 (Aspen, 4th ed. 2010). 
 12. IPCC, supra note 1, at 73. 
 13. Elizabeth C. Black, Climate Change Adaptation: Local Solutions for a 
Global Problem, 22 GEO. INT’L L. REV. 359, 360 (2010) (arguing that, “[u]nlike 
mitigation, adaptation efforts largely involve local decision-making, making it 
difficult to ensure that those responsible for creating the problem also play a 
role in solving it.”). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/5
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produce anything more than modest gains.14 In 2011, the 17th 
Conference of the Parties (“COP”) in Durban, South Africa 
yielded an agreement that only the European Union (“EU”) and a 
small group of other countries, which combined accounted for less 
than fifteen percent of global GHG emissions, could agree to.15 
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted and ratified by much of the 
international community in late 1997—though not becoming 
effective until 2005—is the closest the world has come to setting 
binding emissions reduction targets for the top GHG emitters.16 
Unlike the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”), which merely encourages the stabilization 
of GHG emissions levels, the Kyoto Protocol actually binds 
countries to reductions targets.17 
The United States refused to ratify the Protocol for two 
reasons. First, Kyoto was perceived as being largely futile 
because it does not bind countries like India and China, two of 
the world’s largest GHG emitters,18 to any strict reductions 
targets. Though the U.S. was still the largest emitter at the time, 
the prospect of nonbinding obligations on two of the world’s most 
significant sources of GHG emissions and economic competition 
did not improve the Protocol’s image. Second, the George W. Bush 
Administration thought that the commitments in the Protocol, if 
rigidly adhered to, would “wreck” the U.S. economy.19  This 
resulted in the Senate objecting to the Protocol and ultimately 
 
 14. Justin Gillis, With Carbon Dioxide Emissions at Record High, Worries on 
how to Slow Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/12/03/world/emissions-of-carbon-dioxide-hit-record-in-2011-researchers-
say.html?hp. 
 15. Karl Ritter, UN Climate Change Conference Opens in Doha, Qatar, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 26, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/11/26/un-climate-change-conference-
doha_n_2189959.html?utm_hp_ref=green. 
 16. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
Kyoto Protocol (2012), available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ 
items/2830.php. 
 17. Id. 
 18. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Global Emissions (last updated June 14, 
2012), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html. 
 19. Associated Press, Bush: Kyoto Treaty Would Have Hurt Economy, 
MSNBC, June 30, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8422343/ 
ns/politics/t/bush-kyoto-treaty-would-have-hurt-economy/#.ULQfROOe_Kg. 
5
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passing a resolution to block U.S. involvement in it.20 While false 
dichotomies like ‘environment or economy’ are in disrepute,21 
appealing to them has proven a highly effective means by which 
to defeat or delay action on environmental concerns, this being 
but one example. 
Following Kyoto were several more relative failures, 
including the Copenhagen Summit of 2009, out of which came 
pledges—but no binding agreement—by the U.S. and China to 
reduce emissions,22 the 2010 Cancun Climate Summit,23 the 17th 
COP in Durban, South Africa,24 and Rio+20.25 Though these are 
the most significant climate summits resulting from the Kyoto 
process, COPs have occurred almost annually since 1997, often 
without heads of state in attendance. Unfortunately, the obvious 
lack of political will in these interim conferences has resulted in 
nothing of significance. The absence of mandatory reduction 
targets has been a constant theme in the international context 
and continues to plague global efforts to mitigate climate change. 
But the United States’ failure to address climate change has 
not been limited to the international context. Congress has also 
been unsuccessful in enacting any comprehensive national 
 
 20. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). 
 21. See generally F. Michael Willis, Economic Development, Environmental 
Protection, and the Right to Health, 9 GEO. INT’L L. REV. 195 (1996); For an 
argument that cap-and-trade programs will actually benefit the global economy, 
see Aaron Ezroj, How Cap and Trade will Fuel the Global Economy, 40 ENVTL. 
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10696 (2010). 
 22. Sarah Terry-Cobo, Timeline: The Road to Climate Change Policy, PBS 
FRONTLINE, May 11, 2010, available at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/ 
stories/carbonwatch/2010/05/timeline-the-road-to-climate-change-policy.html. 
 23. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Cancun Agreement Rescues UN Credibility But 
Falls Short of Saving Planet, The Guardian, Dec. 12, 2010, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/dec/12/cancun-agreement-rescues-
un-credibility. 
 24. See Ritter, supra note 16; Durban’s failure is primarily a result of the 
inability of existing signatories to agree to an extension of all of Kyoto’s targets, 
which ultimately led to an agreement that has done little to change the current 
projections of nearly a four degree Celsius temperature hike over the next ten 
years. Richard Black, Climate talks end with late deal, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-16124670. 
 25. See Bryan Walsh, What the Failure of Rio+20 Means for the Climate, 
TIME, June 26, 2012, available at http://www.time.com/time/health/ 
article/0,8599,2118058,00.html. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/5
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legislation addressing GHG emissions.26  Both the House of 
Representatives’ Waxman-Markey bill and the Senate’s Kerry-
Boxer bill, while championed by climate experts as “essential to 
establishing a regulatory system that would achieve real 
emissions reductions, while still considering the needs of the 
energy industry,” were ultimately rendered impotent by 
Congressional inaction.27 Interestingly, the State of California 
passed legislation in 2006 that “established emissions caps in line 
with those agreed on in Kyoto—chiefly, to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to bring those 1990 levels 
down by a further 80 percent by 2050.”28 In addition to those 
caps, the Golden State has developed a carbon market for 
emissions trading, one of the first of its kind in the U.S.29 
However, while California’s progressive actions are laudable, the 
State cannot successfully solve the problem on its own. As a 
consequence of the United States’ (and other countries’) refusal to 
commit to Kyoto or any other binding international framework, 
overall reductions in global GHG emissions have not been 
achieved at a level sufficient to truly combat the current rate of 
climate change. 
Further complicating the process of achieving a binding 
international agreement on climate change is the underlying 
problem shared by many environmental issues: the tragedy of the 
commons.30 Originally recognized by Garrett Hardin, the tragedy 
of the commons is the result of individuals externalizing costs 
when engaged in strategic, rational decision-making regarding 
shared resources.31 Because the commons is collectively owned 
and thus available for general use, each entity’s rational self-
 
 26. Terry-Cobo, supra note 22. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See generally Christopher Burt, C02 and Regulation Authority: The Legal 
and Policy Implications of California’s Proposed Cap-and-Trade Program and 
Clean Air Act National Ambient Air Quality Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 44 
URB. LAW. 429 (2012); see also Sarah Terry-Cobo, Timeline: The Road to Climate 
Change Policy, PBS FRONTLINE, May 11, 2010, available at http://www.pbs.org/ 
frontlineworld/stories/carbonwatch/2010/05/timeline-the-road-to-climate-change-
policy.html. 
 30. Stephen M Gardiner, The Real Tragedy of the Commons, 30 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 387 (2001); See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The 
Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 253 (2000). 
 31. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
7
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interest militates against preservation since the cost of 
exploitation to the individual is less than the (short-term) benefit 
gained.32  To the self-interested, rational actor, the choice is clear. 
The current state of climate change, being the result of the 
accumulation of many individual state actions, exemplifies this 
mindset: the perceived economic benefit associated with not 
reducing GHG emissions outweighs, to many of the most 
substantial emitters, the attendant cost of climate warming.  
However, as Harden predicted, this individual rationality can be 
collectively destructive: “Ruin is the destination toward which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons 
brings ruin to all.”33 
In particular, climate change—because of its 
intergenerational component—presents what Stephen Gardiner 
argues is the “real tragedy of the commons.”34 The effects of CO2 
emissions on global temperature will not be fully realized until 
after the turn of the twenty-second century, making them most 
pressing for generations still unborn.35 Yet, the present 
generation benefits greatly from the energy produced by readily 
available and relatively cheap GHG-emitting fuel sources. Thus, 
“the present generation both causes the environmental damage 
and reaps the rewards” while “most of the costs fall on future 
generations.”36 Gardiner’s ultimate conclusion is less than 
optimistic: “So, what happens is completely up to the present 
generation. And it has powerful self-interested incentives to 
exceed the capacity and thereby alter the climate. . .[O]ther 
things being equal, it is reasonable to expect that the commons 
will be deeply harmed by the present generation.”37 
Yet this view is arguably too pessimistic. While the 
governments of the world have thus far been unable to reach a 
comprehensive international agreement, and the U.S. has also 
lagged domestically in passing legislation, not every level of 
government has been idle and ineffectual. 
 
 32. Id. at 1244. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Gardiner, supra note 30, at 387. 
 35. Id. at 402-03. 
 36. Id. at 403. 
 37. Id. at 404. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/5
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IV.  THE RISE OF REGIONAL RESPONSES TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
The response in the United States to the muted national and 
international efforts has been for states—in particular, New 
York—to form regional agreements with one another to address 
climate change. These agreements range in scope from the cap-
and-trade program of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(“RGGI”)38 to the promotion of transit-oriented development in 
the Transportation and Climate Initiative (“TCI”)39 to the wide-
ranging sea level rise adaptation measures of the Mid-Atlantic 
Governors’ Agreement on Ocean Conservation (“MAGAOC”).40 So 
far, regional approaches have been particularly effective, 
especially given their relatively limited reach, in addressing 
certain aspects of climate change, and ultimately can serve as a 
viable alternative to national and international action for the 
foreseeable future. 
A.  The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
New York State has arranged or signed onto several regional 
agreements. By far the most widely known is RGGI. Developed by 
former New York Governor George Pataki in conjunction with 
several other northeastern states,41 and agreed to in 2005, 
RGGI’s primary contribution to the fight against climate change 
has been a successful cap-and-trade program on power plants 
among the Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states of New York, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and (formerly) New Jersey.42  
The success of RGGI has to do with the fact that “the combined 
greenhouse gas output of the group [of states comprising RGGI] is 
 
 38. See generally RGGI, An Initiative of the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic 
States of the U.S., available at http://www.rggi.org/. 
 39. See generally Georgetown Climate Center, Transportation and Climate 
Initiative, available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/state-action/ 
transportation-and-climate-initiative. 
 40. See generally Mid-Atlantic Regional Council on the Ocean, available at 
http://www.midatlanticocean.org/press-materials.htm. 
 41. Kirsten H Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: 
A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. L.J. 54, 69 (2005). 
 42. RGGI, Memorandum of Understanding (2005), available at 
http://www.rggi.org/. 
9
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14 percent of U.S. emissions and 3.2 percent of world 
emissions.”43 RGGI, therefore, “has the capacity to reduce a 
substantial portion of U.S. emissions and to serve as an example 
for a national emissions trading regime.”44 
Included among the commitments made by RGGI member 
states are developing and maintaining individualized “CO2 
Budget Trading Programs,” tracking CO2 allowances, monitoring 
the newly-created carbon market, and providing technical 
assistance programs designed to assist member states in the 
process of improving the Initiative.45 The Initiative has been 
relatively successful to date, with analysts projecting that the 
“investments made between 2009 and 2011 using proceedings 
from the allowance auctions. . .will help avoid the emission of 12 
million short tons of carbon dioxide pollution.”46 Moreover, RGGI 
also has helped utility customers save over one billion dollars in 
energy costs, has “channeled over $617 million into the region’s 
clean energy economy,” and has generated thousands of clean 
energy sector jobs in the region.47 
However, one of the primary shortcomings of RGGI is the fact 
that the agreement itself lacks any truly binding enforcement 
mechanisms.48 As a result of the agreements voluntary nature, 
several state legislatures—including Delaware, Maine, and New 
Hampshire—have attempted (unsuccessfully) to pass bills 
removing their respective state from RGGI’s cap-and-trade 
program.49 In November 2011, however, New Jersey Governor 
Chris Christie provided notice to the other states in the Initiative 
that New Jersey would be withdrawing from its agreement to the 
 
 43. Engel, supra note 41, at 66. 
 44. Id. at 66. 
 45. RGGI, Mission Statement (2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/rggi. 
 46. RGGI Investments Cut 12M Tons of CO2, ENVTL. LEADER, Nov. 27, 2012, 
available at http://www.environmentalleader.com/2012/11/27/rggi-investments-
cut-12m-tons-of-co2/. 
 47. Id.; see also Joanna Zelman, RGGI Cap-And-Trade Boosted State 
Economies: Report, HUFFINGTONPOST, Mar. 1, 2011, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/01/rggi-cap-and-trade_n_829734.html. 
 48. Mission Statement, supra note 45. 
 49. Sam Wurzelmann, RGGI’s Benefits, Costs, and Why It Should Stay, THE 
ENERGY COLLECTIVE, June 16, 2011, http://theenergycollective.com/wurzelmann/ 
59328/rggi-s-benefits-costs-and-why-it-should-stay. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/5
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Memorandum of Understanding,50 citing the lack of regulation on 
states like Pennsylvania as part of its reason for doing so.51  But 
this is not the end of the story.  In June 2012, several 
environmental groups, including the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, sued the Christie Administration for the unilateral 
withdrawal from RGGI, claiming that it violated a Notice and 
Comment requirement imposed by administrative rules.52 
Whether this lawsuit will force New Jersey to remain a 
temporary member of RGGI until proper administrative 
procedures have been followed is yet to be seen, but regardless of 
how it is resolved, RGGI’s targets and programs are still legally 
unenforceable. 
B.  The Transportation and Climate Initiative 
Focused on altogether different sources of GHG emissions, 
TCI’s efforts are aimed at mitigating emissions from tailpipes 
rather than factory smokestacks. Created by the Georgetown 
Climate Center at Georgetown University in June 2010, TCI is 
directed by transportation, energy, and environmental agency 
heads from New York, Maine, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Vermont, and the District of Columbia.53 
The Initiative “seeks to stimulate sustainable economic 
development and improve the environment by supporting 
innovative technologies and smart planning, and through finding 
greater efficiencies within the transportation sector.”54 TCI’s 
 
 50. BOB MARTIN, COMM’R NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., NOTICE OF 
WITHDRAWAL OF AGREEMENT TO THE RGGI MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
(Nov. 29, 2011). 
 51. New Jersey Quits RGGI, Bans Coal Plants, ENVTL. LEADER, May 27, 2011, 
available at http://www.environmentalleader.com/2011/05/27/new-jersey-pulls-
out-of-rggi-bans-coal-plants/. 
 52. Andrew Harris, New Jersey Sued Over Greenhouse Gas Initiative Pull-
Out, BLOOMBERG, June 6, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
2012-06-06/new-jersey-sued-over-greenhouse-gas-initiative-pull-out.html. 
 53. Georgetown Climate Center, supra note 39. 
 54. GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER, TRANSPORTATION AND CLIMATE INITIATIVE 
OF THE NORTHEAST AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES: BUILDING THE CLEAN ENERGY 
ECONOMY AND REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN THE NORTHEAST 1, 
available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/ 
files/TCI%20brochure.pdf. 
11
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primary focus is on “developing clean vehicles and alternative 
fuels,” “creating sustainable communities” through transit-
oriented development, and “advancing more efficient freight 
movement.”55 Mixed-use and transit-oriented development (or, 
collectively, “smart growth”56) can help to reduce annual vehicle 
miles traveled (“VMT”), a key indicator of transportation-related 
GHG emissions.57 
Because GHG emissions from the transportation sector 
represent nearly thirty percent of total U.S. emissions, regional 
cooperation in the realm of mass transit has the opportunity to be 
incredibly successful in reducing overall GHG emissions.58 While 
federal environmental statutes like Title II of the Clean Air Act 
provide the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) with 
authority to regulate non-stationary sources and impose light-
duty vehicle emissions standards,59 cooperation and regulatory 
oversight with respect to development of mass transit systems 
and promotion of efficient regional freight movement is still 
inadequate.60 In the absence of a fully coordinated federal 
approach, TCI has provided—at least for the Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic regions—an effective approach to these transportation-
related issues. One of its most significant achievements has been 
the creation of the Northeast Electric Vehicle Network, a group of 
northeast states committed to working together to regionally plan 
for expanded use of electric vehicles, particularly with respect to 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Former Maryland Governor Parris Glendening is credited for coining the 
phrase “smart growth.” Karen O’Keefe, Smart Growth’s Governor Parris N. 
Glendening, 6 THE TOWN PAPER 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.tndtownpaper.com/Volume6/parris_glendening.htm. 
 57. PETER HAAS ET AL., TRANSIT ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT AND THE POTENTIAL 
FOR VMT-RELATED GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GROWTH REDUCTION 2 (Center 
for Transit Oriented Development 2010) available at 
http://www.cnt.org/repository/TOD-Potential-GHG-Emissions-
Growth.FINAL.pdf. 
 58. NICHOLAS M. BIANCO & FRANZ T. LITZ, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: USING EXISTING FEDERAL AUTHORITIES AND 
STATE ACTION 12 (World Resources Institute 2010). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Joanna D. Malaczynski & Timothy P. Duane, Reducing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions From Vehicle Miles Traveled: Integrating the California 
Environmental Quality Act with the California Global Warming Solutions Act, 
36 ECOLOGY L. Q. 71, 79 (2009). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/5
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siting charging stations.61 Promoting use of non-fossil fuel 
burning vehicles can have a significant impact on reducing GHG 
emissions, and TCI has made a coordinated effort on this front 
possible. 
 
C.  The Mid-Atlantic Governors’ Agreement on Ocean 
Conservation 
Both RGGI and TCI are regional initiatives focused on 
mitigating GHG emissions. The MAGAOC, on the other hand, is 
oriented toward adaptation to the inevitable impacts of climate 
change. Recognizing that “the economy, environment and quality 
of life of the Mid-Atlantic region will be significantly impacted by 
climate change and associated sea level rise in the coming 
decades,” the MAGAOC’s concern is with arguably the greatest of 
all commons: the Atlantic Ocean.62 Created in 2009 by the 
Governors of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and 
Virginia, the MAGAOC formed the Mid-Atlantic Regional Council 
on the Ocean (“MARCO”) with the express intent of 
“[maintaining] and [improving] the health of our ocean and 
coastal resources, and [ensuring] that they continue to contribute 
to the high quality of life and economic vitality of our region’s 
communities well into the future.”63 
The MAGAOC recognizes the interrelationship between 
communities and economies, and hopes to capitalize on that 
understanding through coordinated efforts aimed at protecting 
sensitive habitats and populations from climate change-related 
risks like flooding and erosion.64 As of 2011, the MAGAOC’s 
largest contributions to effective climate change adaptation have 
been the development of “targeted messaging of the risks of 
 
 61. Northeast states form electric vehicle network, WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
APd8e72ba90ab5493fa4c6bcfd5f1319d1.html. 
 62. ACTIONS, TIMELINES, AND LEADERSHIP TO ADVANCE THE MID-ATLANTIC 
GOVERNORS’ AGREEMENT ON OCEAN CONSERVATION 9 (June 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.midatlanticocean.org/summary-actions.pdf. 
 63. Mid-Atlantic Regional Council on the Ocean, Mid-Atlantic Governors’ 
Agreement on Ocean Conservation, June 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.midatlanticocean.org/agreement.pdf. 
 64. Id. 
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climate change and sea level rise to communities” and the 
collection of comprehensive data necessary to “create a regional 
sea level rise inundation map.”65 While these achievements may 
appear limited at this time, they are a first and necessary step to 
implementing more comprehensive climate change adaptation 
measures. 
V.   GUBERNATORIAL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
Common to each of the three aforementioned regional 
agreements is the source of authority used to create them. 
Gubernatorial executive authority generally is greater in scope 
than its federal analog, which is restricted by the U.S. 
Constitution.66 This is the case because “‘state governments[,] 
acting through their state legislatures[,] are presumed to have 
broad, residual, almost plenary governmental power’ except 
insofar as these are limited by state constitutions,” and often 
gubernatorial executive authority is conferred by statute.67 Since 
“all of the states have made statutory changes. . .and/or 
constitutional changes to grant their governors more formal 
powers,” gubernatorial executive authority is maximally provided 
for throughout the United States.68 In particular, the unique 
powers afforded the Governor of New York have been 
instrumental in the creation and development of the three 
regional agreements at the heart of this Article. 
In New York, the constitutional provision providing for 
gubernatorial executive power was added in 1821 “in apparent 
emulation of the vesting clause in the United States 
Constitution.”69 This was not the final word on gubernatorial 
 
 65. MID-ATLANTIC REGIONAL COUNCIL ON THE OCEAN, HIGHLIGHTS: MOVING IN 
THE RIGHT DIRECTION 7 (2011), available at http://www.midatlanticocean.org/ 
mitrd.pdf. 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (stating that “the executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office 
during the Term of four Years…”). 
 67. Gerald Benjamin & Zachary Keck, Executive Orders and Gubernatorial 
Authority to Reorganize State Government, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2010). 
 68. Margaret R. Ferguson, Roles, Functions, and Powers of the Governors, 
CTR ON THE AM. GOVERNOR (2013), available at http://governors.rutgers.edu/ 
usgov/gov_intro_chpt2.php. 
 69. Benjamin & Keck, supra note 67, at 1615. 
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authority in New York, however. Over the next hundred or so 
years, the New York Constitution would be revamped several 
times leading to, among other changes, amendments that 
provided for a more powerful Governor with a four year term and 
expanded authority over all state agencies and the budget 
process.70  While the roles and responsibilities of all state 
governors are basically the same, the scope of authority of each 
state’s governor varies in accordance with the respective state 
constitutions and laws.71 New York’s current Constitution 
provides that the Governor shall “expedite all such measures as 
may be resolved upon by the legislature” and “take care that the 
laws are faithfully executed.”72 Moreover, when the Governor of 
New York issues an executive order pursuant to lawful authority, 
“his or her actions are largely beyond judicial review.”73 
Therefore, according to New York Jurisprudence, a leading source 
on New York law: 
[J]udicial review of a governor’s action by executive order 
pursuant to a valid grant of discretionary authority is generally 
limited to determining whether the state constitution or 
legislature has empowered the governor to act, and does not 
include the manner in which the governor chooses to discharge 
that authority. For abuse of lawful discretionary authority, the 
remedy as a rule lies with the people at the polls, or with a 
constitutional amendment, or with corrective legislation.74 
Ultimately, the Governor of New York has broad authority to 
issue executive orders and otherwise exercise executive power, 
including through control of administrative agencies. That 
authority, however, is not without its limits. 
Several times since the mid-Twentieth Century, the New 
York Court of Appeals—the court of last resort for the State—has 
invalidated the Governor’s use of executive power as “[going] 
 
 70. John T. Buckley, The Governor—From Figurehead to Prime Minister: A 
Historical Study of the New York State Constitution and the Shift of Basic Power 
to the Chief Executive, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 865, 867 (2005). 
 71. Nat’l Governors Ass’n, Governors’ Powers and Authority (2011), 
http://www.nga.org/cms/home/management-resources/governors-powers-and-
authority.html. 
 72. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 73. 96 N.Y. Jur. 2d State of New York § 12. 
 74. Id. 
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beyond state legislative policy and [prescribing] a remedial device 
not embraced by the policy.”75 However, in giving definition to 
what “going beyond” state legislative policy means, the Court, in 
Clark v. Cuomo, said, “It is only when the executive acts 
inconsistently with the legislature, or usurps its prerogatives, 
that the doctrine of separation [of powers] is violated.”76 Thus, 
“the purposes of the executive order[,] however desirable, may be 
achieved only through proper means. No single branch of 
government may assume a power, especially if assumption of that 
power might erode the genius of that system. The erosion need 
not be great.”77 
Understanding the basic strictures of gubernatorial executive 
authority in New York is crucial to an analysis of that power as it 
was used to create and join the three regional agreements 
discussed in this Article. This is so because, as John Cahill noted 
regarding his involvement in environmental issues in New York, 
the development of environmental law and policy “really came 
down to the executive utilizing the powers that he has, through 
executive orders, through control of the regulatory agencies that 
are under his domain, as well as his authorities to use market 
powers to help change and help drive the environmental policy.”78 
Gubernatorial executive authority has proven particularly 
invaluable in the realm of environmental law and policy in New 
York State. First, it has allowed for relatively quick responses to 
pressing environmental concerns by avoiding expressly dealing 
with the New York State legislature, a tremendous advantage 
when immediate and decisive action is necessary.79 Moreover, 
executive authority has allowed for incremental, small-scale 
changes to environmental policy and law.80 While landmark court 
cases and legislation concerning environmental matters are 
important, these smaller, more frequent actions have a 
significant impact as well.  By creating continuity in progress, 
 
 75. Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 163 (1978); see also Oneida Cnty v. Berle, 
49 N.Y.2d 515 (1980). 
 76. 66 N.Y.2d 185, 189 (1985). 
 77. Rapp, 44 N.Y.2d at 167. 
 78. John P. Cahill, Environmental Law in New York State: The Past as 
Prologue to the Future, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 441 (2008). 
 79. Id. at 444. 
 80. Id. at 447. 
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these changes have allowed the private sector to confidently 
invest in new technologies and processes. Finally, the use of 
gubernatorial executive authority also has allowed the Governor 
to take action on controversial environmental issues that were 
unlikely to be addressed by the more politically-mind state 
legislature. While the general public may support action on 
certain matters, “there’s always the issue of dealing with 
particular legislators in both houses to try to accomplish anything 
in the New York Legislature.”81 This is particularly the case in 
Albany, where achieving progress through the legislative process 
can seem impossible at times.82 
A great example of effective use of executive power to tackle a 
politically-charged environmental problem is Governor Pataki’s 
response to dirty air in New York City. In 2000, the Metropolitan 
Transit Authority (“MTA”)—which provides all of the mass 
transit services in New York City—was the largest purchaser of 
buses in the world and needed to submit a new five year capital 
plan.83 Governor Pataki decided that the diesel buses, whose 
emissions of significant amounts of particulate matter, nitrogen 
oxide, and sulfur oxide were creating a public health crisis, 
needed to be redesigned to improve air quality.84 To accomplish 
this, the Governor helped develop a capital plan that required 
MTA to convert to natural gas and hybrid buses, which led to 
significant improvements in air quality in the city.85 Had this 
been attempted in the state legislature, there is no telling how 
much more time and political capital would have been necessary 
to achieve the result ultimately obtained through unilateral 
executive action. Immediate action was necessary, and executive 
authority allowed the Governor to decisively address the problem. 
This is but one example of the Governor utilizing the Office’s 
great potential. 
Another example involves the creation and maintenance of 
RGGI’s cap-and-trade program. As noted, RGGI originated in 
2001 when Governor Pataki announced the formation of the 
Greenhouse Gas Working Group, a coalition of Northeast states 
 
 81. Id. at 443-44. 
 82. Id. at 443. 
 83. Cahill, supra note 78, at 444. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 444-45. 
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committed to addressing climate change.86 In 2003, “the Governor 
sent a letter to all of the northeastern states asking them to join 
in a cap-and-trade program for the northeast [because the United 
States was] not going to see action on a federal level and [] the 
region needed to do something.”87 RGGI was officially agreed to 
in a Memorandum of Understanding in 2005,88 which led to 
further statewide commitments by then-Governor David 
Patterson in Executive Order No. 24 in 2009.89 In part, the 
Governor committed the State to reductions of “current 
greenhouse gas emissions from all sources within the State eighty 
percent (80%) below levels emitted in the year nineteen hundred 
ninety (1990) by the year two-thousand fifty (2050).”90 
TCI is also the product of executive authority, albeit through 
the proxy of administrative agencies. The heads of the 
transportation, environmental, and energy agencies in each of the 
state signatories to the Initiative are tasked with evaluating 
current infrastructure and transportation options and creating 
regional policies to promote sustainable development and smart 
growth.91 The Initiative is meant to build on the progress of 
RGGI by focusing on vehicle emissions as a supplement to RGGI’s 
efforts to reduce power plant emissions.92 Representing New York 
were Commissioner Alexander B. Grannis of the New York 
Department of Environmental Conservation, Acting 
Commissioner Stanley Gee of the New York Department of 
Transportation, and Chairman Garry A. Brown of the New York 
 
 86. Id. at 446. 
 87. Id. 
 88. RGGI, Memorandum of Understanding (2005), available at 
http://www.rggi.org/design/history/mou. 
 89. State of New York, Exec. Order No. 24 (2009). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Transportation & Climate Initiative, Agreement of the Northeast and 
Mid-Atlantic States to Support Sustainable Communities (June 7, 2011), 
available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/ 
TCI_Sustainable_Communities_June2011(1).pdf. 
 92. Georgetown Climate Center, Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States Launch 
Major Climate and Transportation Initiative (June 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/northeast-and-mid-atlantic-states-launch-
major-climate-and-transportation-initiative. 
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Public Service Commission.93 These agency heads set as the goal 
for New York State a reduction in VMT of 10%.94 Such a 
commitment likely would have required significantly more time 
and capital to pass the legislature, and may well never have 
occurred. 
The MAGAOC, which formed MARCO, was created in a 
manner more similar to RGGI than TCI. New York Governor 
David Paterson, along with New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine, 
hosted the Mid-Atlantic Governors’ Ocean Summit in June 
2009.95 The summit resulted in the signing of the MAGAOC by 
five eastern and mid-Atlantic coastal states.96 The governors of 
the member states agreed to, among other things, “[c]oordinate 
protection of important habitats and sensitive and unique 
offshore areas on a regional scale,” “[c]ollaborate on a regional 
approach to support the sustainable development of renewable 
energy in offshore areas,” and, importantly, “[p]repare the 
region’s coastal communities for the impacts of climate change on 
ocean and coastal resources.”97 Noting that much of the 
infrastructure in the Northeast and mid-Atlantic regions is 
unprotected, the Council further agreed to “[i]dentify key 
infrastructure that is vulnerable to sea level rise” and initiate 
“adaption measures to collectively reduce the region’s 
vulnerability to climate change and sea level rise.”98 These far-
reaching efforts on adapting to the realities of climate change on 
a regional level likely would not have been possible to achieve in 
the legislatures of each of the five participating states. Rather 
than wait for more aggressive action, Governors Paterson and 
 
 93. Transportation & Climate Initiative, Declaration of Intent ( ), available at 
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/public-documents/TCI-
declaration.pdf. 
 94. Transporation & Climate Initiative, Summary of Policy Options in State 
Climate Action Plans ( ), at 6, available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/ 
sites/default/files/public-documents/TCI-SummaryofPolicyOptionsin 
ClimateAction.PDF. 
 95. Actions, Timelines, and Leadership to Advance the Mid-Atlantic 
Governors’ Agreement on Ocean Conservation (2009), at 1, available at 
http://www.midatlanticocean.org/summary-actions.pdf. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Mid-Atlantic Regional Council on the Ocean, supra note 63. 
 98. Actions, Timelines, and Leadership, supra note 95, at 1. 
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Corzine took the initiative to develop and promote another 
successful regional environmental organization. 
This desire for decisive action is a common theme among 
many regional agreements. Gubernatorial executive authority 
has allowed for these agreements (and countless others) to be 
created and entered into by states across the U.S. without wading 
into the gridlock of state legislative action. But the ease and 
relative flexibility provided by regional agreements is not without 
its limitations. 
VI.  CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON EXECUTIVE 
AUTHORITY 
Each of the three agreements discussed herein was created 
and has been maintained through the exercise of gubernatorial 
executive authority. However, the United States’ federalist 
system of governance includes certain limiting characteristics 
that check the power of its competing bodies, including the power 
of individual states. The Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
and the doctrine of separation of powers limit, respectively, the 
ability of states to engage in binding agreements with one 
another to the exclusion of the federal government and the power 
of the executive. Regional climate change agreements must be 
evaluated in light of each of these characteristics of the U.S. 
system. 
A.  Compact Clause 
One of the primary shortcomings of regional agreements in 
general—and of RGGI, TCI, and MAGAOC in particular—is the 
fact that they lack regulatory enforcement authority. This is the 
case not only for political reasons, but also because of the limits 
imposed by the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Article 
I, section 10 of the U.S. Constitution dictates that “[n]o State 
shall, without the Consent of Congress. . .enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign 
Power.”99 This Constitutional prohibition on cooperative state 
action severely limits the potential impact that regional 
 
 99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
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agreements can have on interstate issues. However, the 
prohibition is not as absolute as it appears. 
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the scope of the 
Compact Clause before the turn of the Twentieth Century in 
Virginia v. Tennessee. There, the Commonwealth of Virginia and 
the State of Tennessee disputed the location of a boundary line 
that had been established by legislative decree nearly a century 
before.100 In the course of determining the validity of the 
boundary line, the Court analyzed whether the agreement 
between the states constituted a constitutionally-prohibited 
compact. After giving examples of the kinds of agreements and 
compacts that would not require Congressional consent, Justice 
Field declared that by “[l]ooking at the clause in which the terms 
‘compact’ or ‘agreement’ appear, it is evident that the prohibition 
is directed to the formation of any combination tending to the 
increase of political power in the states, which may encroach 
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United 
States.”101 He further clarified that Congress can consent to 
compacts both expressly and by implication, such as when 
Congress enforces an agreement between states.102 Ultimately, 
the Court held that Congress had implicitly consented to the 
agreement between Virginia and Tennessee fixing the boundary 
line, and that it therefore was valid and constituted the legal 
boundary between the states. 
More recently the Supreme Court has given further guidance 
on this definition of prohibited compacts. In U.S. Steel 
Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission, at issue was the 
validity of an agreement between multiple states to form a tax 
commission to facilitate uniformity in state taxation in the 
region.103 The Court there held that the “number of parties to an 
agreement is irrelevant if it does not impermissibly enhance state 
power at the expense of federal supremacy.”104 Despite the fact 
that the compact may result in an “incremental increase in the 
bargaining power of the member States [in relation to] the 
corporations subject to their respective taxing jurisdictions,” the 
 
 100. Com. of Va. v. State of Tenn., 148 U.S. 503, 504 (1893). 
 101. Id. at 519. 
 102. Id. at 521. 
 103. 434 U.S. 452, 456 (1978). 
 104. Id. at 472. 
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Court held that the agreement did not enhance the political 
power of the states at the expense of the federal government 
enough to violate the Compact Clause.105 In so holding, the Court 
carefully enumerated two key considerations leading to this 
conclusion: first, that “each State retain[ed] complete freedom to 
adopt or reject the rules and regulations of the Commission”; and 
second, that “each State [was] free to withdraw at any time.”106 
In other words, so long as agreements between states are largely 
voluntary, the Compact Clause likely will not pose a problem. 
The regional agreements at the heart of this Article are 
largely insulated from challenges under the Compact Clause 
because of their unenforceability, a constitutionally required yet 
severely limiting feature. Kirsten Engel, Professor of Law at the 
University of Arizona, agrees, arguing that “[a]s a result of the 
Compact Clause. . .regional action on climate change is ‘safest’ 
constitutionally if limited to voluntary, nonbinding efforts among 
participating states.”107 RGGI provides the prime example of how 
this constitutionally-required unenforceability can limit the 
potential positive impact of regional climate change agreements. 
New Jersey Governor Christie’s decision to unilaterally withdraw 
from RGGI in 2012, a decision currently embroiled in litigation, 
was only feasible because of this limitation.108 Citing the 
unenforceability of the agreement, as well as the perceived notion 
that “RGGI does nothing more than tax electricity, tax our 
citizens, tax our businesses, with no discernible or measurable 
impact upon our environment,”109 Governor Christie engaged in 
the very conduct that plagues voluntary agreements like RGGI, 
TCI, and MAGAOC. By withdrawing the State of New Jersey 
from the Initiative, Governor Christie singlehandedly reduced the 
overall impact on emissions reductions in the region and the 
bargaining power of RGGI member states. 
The unenforceability of compacts that otherwise would 
challenge federal supremacy is a necessary feature to survive 
 
 105. Id. at 472-73. 
 106. Id. at 473. 
 107. Engel, supra note 41, at 73. 
 108. See infra Section IV. 
 109. Mireya Navarro, Christie Pulls New Jersey From 10-State Climate 
Initiative, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/05/27/nyregion/christie-pulls-nj-from-greenhouse-gas-coalition.html?_r=0. 
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judicial scrutiny, but it also severely limits the efficacy of regional 
agreements. Ultimately, as long as regional climate change 
agreements are based on voluntary compliance or consented to by 
Congress, the Compact Clause does not pose a significant legal 
barrier. 110 The advantage to seeking and receiving congressional 
consent is that the states involved could ensure enforceability and 
simultaneously comply with constitutional strictures. 
Congressional action, however, is more easily discussed than 
achieved, and it is for that reason that the doctrine of separation 
of powers is also a necessary component of the U.S. system of 
governance. 
B.  Separation of Powers 
The Compact Clause is not the only constitutional limit 
affecting regional agreements. The doctrine of separation of 
powers applies to these agreements as well. The doctrine 
demands that each branch of government—executive, legislative, 
and judicial—exercise only those powers granted to it by the 
governing charter. For the purposes of this Article, that 
governing charter is the New York Constitution. 
Separation of powers in New York is “included by implication 
in the pattern of government adopted by” the state.111  Generally, 
the legislature is authorized to make laws—and the “critical 
policy decisions” that inform them—while the governor is 
delegated the authority to enforce those laws.112 However, New 
York’s lawmaking department is not as discretely defined as 
most. In New York, the legislature is not the sole lawmaker; 
rather, the legislature, in conjunction with the governor, fills that 
role.113  Therefore, while the executive cannot directly legislate, 
the Governor of New York has substantial power over 
administrative rulemaking, a process that can be difficult to 
differentiate from lawmaking.114 Importantly, however, any 
 
 110. See Engel, supra note 41, at 73-75. 
 111. Principles of separation, generally, 20 N.Y. Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 
152. 
 112. Limitations with respect to legislature, 20 N.Y. Jur.2d Constitutional Law 
§ 158; see also 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 250. 
 113. Limitations with respect to legislature, 20 N.Y. Jur.2d Constitutional Law 
§ 158. 
 114. Id. 
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exercise of power by a branch not accorded that power constitutes 
a violation of the doctrine, such as “when the executive acts 
inconsistently with the legislature, or usurps its prerogatives.”115 
It is just this potential scenario, the executive overstepping its 
defined limits, that is of concern for regional climate change 
agreements. 
One of the advantages to the regional agreements discussed 
herein is the ability of the executive branch to circumvent the 
legislature, either through executive order or direction to the 
commissioners of the many state agencies. This not only saves 
time and resources, but also preserves political capital that the 
executive needs to effectively promote his or her agenda. 
However, it is this very characteristic of RGGI, TCI, and 
MAGAOC that could result in the agreements’ invalidation on 
grounds of violation of separation of powers. 
The New York Court of Appeals, in Saratoga County 
Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, addressed the separation of 
powers issue in the context of casinos on Native American 
reservations. Former Governor Cuomo entered into a compact 
between the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe and the State of New York 
to allow the tribe to continue providing gambling services, an 
action challenged by Chamber of Commerce as violating 
separation of powers.116 The Court held that because there was 
no legislative authorization for the state agencies to regulate 
casino gambling, the Governor’s actions constituted a usurpation 
of the legislature’s power.117 Critically, however, the Court also 
held, in Bourquin v. Cuomo, that “[l]egislative inaction, because 
of its inherent ambiguity, ‘affords the most dubious foundation for 
drawing positive inferences’” of hostile legislative intent.118 In 
other words, simply because the legislature has not yet acted on a 
matter does not necessarily remove it from the realm of executive 
control or render executive action on it ultra vires. 
Nevertheless, Saratoga County could prove problematic for 
regional climate change agreements like RGGI, TCI, and 
 
 115. Principles of separation, supra note 112. 
 116. Saratoga Cnty Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 808-09 
(2003). 
 117. Id. at 823. 
 118. 85 N.Y.2d 781, 787-88 (1995) (quoting Clark v. Cuomo, 66 N.Y.2d 185, 
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MAGAOC. Each of these agreements was executed precisely 
because of the lack of legislative will to address the problems of 
power plant emissions, vehicle emissions, and insufficient coastal 
adaptation measures. Therefore, it would not be surprising if a 
New York court were to find that any of the three agreements 
was the result of the executive overstepping its constitutionally-
defined role by promulgating agreements outside of what is 
legislatively authorized. However, given the Court’s caution in 
Bourquin that legislative inaction is not necessarily indicative of 
adverse legislative intent, there is room for argument that RGGI, 
TCI, and MAGAOC are not the result of the Governor usurping 
legislative authority. If and when this is found to be the case, the 
scope of executive action available as a result could lead to an 
increase in the prominence of regional agreements. 
VII.  REGIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE WAY 
FORWARD 
Regional agreements have much to offer in the way of 
mitigating and adapting to climate change. This is so for several 
reasons. First, “a regional program is likely to encompass a larger 
geographic area and more centers of population, and thus is likely 
to have the potential to result in a larger contribution to climate 
change mitigation than an approach limited to a single state. . 
.”119 Therefore, when compared to the emissions-reduction 
potential of individual state or municipal actions, a regional 
approach is more likely to cast a wider emissions reduction net, 
thereby more dramatically affecting overall GHG emissions. 
Second, because regional approaches to emissions reductions 
employ uniform standards of regulation within the respective 
region, greater emissions reductions should be achievable because 
the predictability of a uniform standard is likely to “overcome 
industry resistance to greenhouse gas regulation.”120 Admittedly, 
a uniform federal standard would be ideal; but regional 
approaches at least offer consistency on a greater level than mere 
state or municipal initiatives. Consequently, though the 
 
 119. Engel, supra note 41, at 68. 
 120. Id. at 69. 
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proverbial “race to the bottom”121 is a common occurrence in the 
context of disparate, localized environmental law, it is probable 
that the “benefits of a uniform regional approach [are] likely to 
outweigh the benefits of particular ‘pockets’ of less stringent 
regulation.”122 Moreover, many resources are regionally located 
(e.g., the coal deposits of Appalachia and the natural gas reserves 
of the Marcellus Shale region), so the existence of regional 
standards guiding how those resources are harnessed and used 
can, to an extent, combat the race to the bottom. 
Finally, and most important, is the fact that regional 
approaches to climate change “allow states to develop a joint 
strategy to reduce greenhouse gases, and, at the same time, 
ensure reliable energy sources for the region.”123 For example, 
because electricity is provided for on a regional basis in the U.S., 
and because electricity production in the form of fossil-fuel-fired 
power plants contributes over one-third of annual U.S. GHG 
emissions,124 regional approaches to reductions are likely to 
substantially affect the electricity sector’s GHG emissions.125  The 
wider the emissions reductions net cast, the greater the impact 
that can be realized, and at this time regional agreements provide 
the largest feasible net. 
Yet, regional agreements suffer from their own imperfections. 
Adding to the complexity of achieving successful regional 
cooperation is the notion that, in such multi-actor paradigms, 
states are aligned against one another in a macroscopic version of 
the prisoner’s dilemma.126 The concept of a prisoner’s dilemma 
“illustrates a conflict between individual and group rationality,” 
where “it is difficult to get rational, selfish agents to cooperate for 
their common good.”127  Because regional agreements must be 
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voluntary in order to avoid Compact Clause problems,128 
individual ‘state rationality’ can override the collective interest 
embedded in strict compliance with the requirements of the 
agreement. Such individual self-interest overtaking the collective 
good can—much like Governor Christie’s decision to unilaterally 
withdraw from RGGI in 2012 did—compromise the efficacy of an 
agreement that otherwise has great potential. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Regional agreements aimed at addressing the causes and 
effects of climate change are being used by states like New York 
to address environmental concerns that have yet to gain national 
traction. These agreements have yielded remarkable results, but 
they are not ideal. Aside from the potential constitutional hurdles 
they face, their scope is inherently limited to the region in which 
they apply.  For a truly global problem like climate change, this 
scope may not be broad enough to prevent the long term 
catastrophic consequences of a warming planet. 
Ultimately, regional agreements best serve as stopgaps until 
effective national—and eventually international—approaches to 
mitigating and adapting to climate change can be implemented. 
Such a model of localized effort resulting in more far-reaching 
action is not unprecedented. In fact, “[m]any U.S. federal 
environmental laws and multilateral international environmental 
agreements came about partly in reaction to the regulatory 
measures implemented by lower-level jurisdictions.”129 This 
trend, as well as the existing cooperative framework of most 
federal environmental law, allows for ready integration by 
Congress of regional agreements into a more unified national 
approach. Yet, until the political will to effectuate national 
legislation appears, regional agreements will continue to play a 
vital and central role in addressing climate change. 
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